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REF'LCTIO0
THE DEATH AND TRANSFIGURATION
OF FRYE
Richard D. Friedman*
"The decision in Daubert kills Frye and then resurrects its ghost."'
I. THE DEATH OF FRYE
The rule of Frye v. United States2 was seventy years old, and had long
dominated American law on the question of how well established a scientific
principle must be for it to provide the basis for expert testimony. Even after
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, several of the federal circuits,
as well as various states, purported to adhere to Frye's "general acceptance"
standard. But now, unanimously, briefly, and with no apparent angst, the
United States Supreme Court has held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.3 that the Frye rule is incompatible with the Federal Rules.
This outcome might appear startling were it not so sensible. General
acceptance sounds more like the language of judicial notice than of
*Richard D. Friedman is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Conversations with Michael Green, David Kaye, and Joseph Sanders have limited
though I fear not eliminated - the number and severity of errors in this piece.
1. In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp.
1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Sweet, J.).
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
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admissibility. In trials, we expect evidence to be conflicting. In most
contexts, a court does not demand that it be satisfied that a proposition is
almost certainly true before admitting evidence of, or based on, that
proposition. So long as a juror might reasonably think that the evidence aids
substantially in the truth-determining process, we are ordinarily content to
present the evidence to the jury and ask it to evaluate the evidence as part
of its overall factf'mding job. And if the case is tried without a jury, there is,
if anything, less reason to preclude the factfinder from relying in part on an
expert opinion merely because the theory on which the opinion is based has
not gained general acceptance.
Thus, excluding scientific evidence that does not have general acceptance
is, as Justice Blackmun put it in Daubert, an unduly "austere standard." 4
It conflicts not only with the language of Rule 702 - which allows an expert
opinion based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" if it
"will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue" - but also with the liberal nature of the Rules in general, as
exemplified by Rule 102,1 and of modem evidentiary law.
II. QUESTIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
Though some states may yet adhere to the Frye rule,6 the best guess is
that most will follow the Supreme Court's lead and reject it. But of course
the supposed death of Frye raises one large and troubling question, from
which many subsidiary and troubling questions devolve: If Frye is dead,
what will take its place?
Surely there must be some substitute, because the problem addressed by
Frye is endemic to our adjudicative system. Indeed, it is endemic to any
adjudicative system in which the factfinding process seeks to take advantage
of specialized knowledge that might help determine the truth but in which the
factf'mders themselves lack such knowledge. Given the factfinders' lack of
knowledge, and perhaps their inability to assess adequately the information
they are provided, the basic dilemma is clear. If we exclude the expert
evidence from the factfinders' consideration, we may be depriving the truth-
4. Id. at 2794.
5. Rule 102 provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
6. See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (adhering to Frye
despite Daubert's construction of Fed. R. Evid. 702 as superseding Frye).
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determining process of information that would assist in learning the truth. On
the other hand, it may be that the evidence is in fact worthless, or of far less
value than the factfinder is likely to attribute to it. Thus, allowing the
factfinders to hear and use the evidence may actually lead them further away
from the truth.
The problem is more pressing in the context of an adversarial system in
which a party is able to recruit experts who will present testimony favoring
that party's interests, and in which an expert often has strong incentive to
persuade the factfinder of the merits of the sponsoring party's position. Even
if the great weight of learning points in one direction, a party seeking to
persuade the factfinder in the other direction will often be able to find an
expert who is willing to go counter to the majority. If we could be sure that
truth never lay with the dissenters, or with those who claim to be pioneers,
this difficulty could often be satisfactorily addressed by a rule resembling
Frye. But we do not generally have that confidence, for "time has upset
many fighting faiths"7 in science as well as in law. Particularly in the
context of litigation, it is important to remember that the views of the
scientific establishment on a particular issue may reflect the interests of those
who have the financial ability and incentive to support research and
publication directed to that issue. Moreover, often we do not know enough
about a field, or the precise issue in dispute has not been crystallized long
enough, even to identify one position or the other as the majority view.
And the problem becomes yet more severe, and at the same time takes
on an ironic aspect, when a jury is the factfinder. Acting through the courts,
the adjudicative system must decide whether the jury - which it may regard
as rather impressionable and unsophisticated - is to have access to the
expert opinion. But the courts themselves lack the relevant specialized know-
ledge, and often must struggle themselves to understand the subject matter.
Perhaps in light of these complexities, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justice Stevens, expressed the view in Daubert that the wisest course was
not to venture to create a replacement for the Frye rule. They would have
stopped with the declaration of Frye's death, "leaving the further develop-
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life
Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 346 (1992) ("Careerist concerns may
have caused academics to select topics that would lead to publication in prestigious
journals. Moreover, the federal government, through the FDA, encouraged research
by offering grants to fund the study of Bendectin's effects. Finally, the Bendectin
litigation itself generated research, as parties encouraged and even funded work on
Bendectin. Legal needs gave shape and direction to the epidemiological study of
teratogenic effects. The volume and sophistication of studies focusing specifically on
Bendectin was, in large part, the result of the litigation.") (footnote omitted).
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ment of this important area of the law to future cases." 9 But Justice
Blackmun, writing for the other justices, was unwilling to leave the matter
quite so much in the air.' 0 He expressed confidence in the capacity of the
adversary system to avoid the "wholesale exclusion" of evidence under Frye
without descending to "a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions.""
For one thing, Justice Blackmun reminded the courts of their power to
grant judgment as a matter of law against a party when all the evidence
considered together would not support judgment in that party's favor.'
Often, indeed, it may be that, even assuming the proffered expert evidence
is admissible, the whole of the proof is insufficient to support a finding of
the proposition for which the evidence is offered. If, for example, scientific
evidence, but no other evidence, is admitted in a criminal case to prove some
element of the prosecution's case, the court may well decide that doubts
about the validity of the scientific evidence would necessarily cause a
conscientious jury to have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. In
a civil case, too, the gap between admissibility and sufficiency may well
become significant. And the question of whether the court should grant
judgment as a matter of law may actually be easier to resolve than the
question of whether the expert evidence is admissible.
Daubert itself is illustrative. Daubert is one of many cases brought by
persons who claimed that they suffered serious birth defects as a result of
their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug
formerly marketed by Merrell Dow. The most serious defects claimed, and
the ones involved in most of the litigation, are limb reduction defects.
Merrell Dow has consistently maintained that Bendectin is not a human
teratogen - that is, a substance capable of causing birth defects in human
fetuses - and that no admissible evidence leads to the conclusion that it is.
Merrell Dow has been able to demonstrate beyond genuine dispute that there
have been more than 30 published epidemiological (human statistical) studies,
involving over 130,000 patients, that have examined the relation between
Bendectin and human birth defects, and that none of these studies has
concluded that Bendectin is a human teratogen.' 3 The claimants have
9. 113 S.Ct. at 2800 (dissenting in part and concurring in part).
10. 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95 & n.7.
11. Id. at 2798.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2791. Some of the studies, however, were at least suggestive that
Bendectin might cause some human birth defects. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1354-57 (6th Cir. 1992); Joseph Sanders,
From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1993) (summarizing, though not advocating, "The Case
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offered both in vitro (test tube) studies of animal cells and in vivo (live)
studies of animals showing that Bendectin causes birth defects in animals;
pharmacological studies purporting to show similarities between the chemical
structure of Bendectin and that of other substances known to cause birth
defects; and unpublished reanalyses of the previously published epidemiologi-
cal studies, purporting to show that, while the studies taken individually do
not warrant the conclusion that Bendectin is a human teratogen, taken
together and in conjunction with the other evidence, and subjected to proper
statistical analysis, they are at least suggestive of an association between
Bendectin and limb reduction defects. 4
It is certainly at least arguable that each of the components of the
claimants' evidence ought to be admissible. Each component contains
information that might be useful in more fully understanding the nature and
effects of Bendectin, and it is not self-evident that the evidence would lead
the jury farther away from the truth, rather than closer to it. But even if the
evidence is admissible, that does not mean it is sufficient to warrant a verdict
in the claimant's favor. Perhaps a court could conclude that a reasonable
jury, presented with all the evidence, could not rationally conclude, at least
to the degree of confidence required by the judicial system, 5 that Bendectin
is a human teratogen. More likely, a court might easily conclude that -
even if the jury accepts all the claimants' evidence, and finds that Bendectin
is indeed a human teratogen - the evidence suggests such a weak linkage
between Bendectin and human birth defects that the jury could not reasonably
conclude that any individual claimant's defects were more likely than not
caused by Bendectin. 16 Thus, a court might hold, as at least two have in
Against Bendectin").
14. See Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2791-92; DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946-49 (3d Cir. 1990); Affidavit of Shanna Helen Swan,
App. 113-117, in Daubert. In DeLuca, the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Alan Done, was
willing to make a stronger statement, that the "bulk of the available human
epidemiological data ... are indicative of human teratogenicity." 911 F.2d at 948-
49. On remand, the trial court held his testimony inadmissible, in large part because
of the court's perception that "Dr. Done's epidemiological methodology yielded
erroneous results so frequently that it is not helpful to the trier of fact." DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1057 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd,
6 F.3d 778 (1993) (without opinion), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3350 (Jan. 10,
1994).
15. The received wisdom is that in an ordinary civil case we demand that the
plaintiff satisfy the jury only that her factual contentions are more likely true than
not. I believe, though, that in most cases a more stringent standard may actually be
at play. See Richard D. Friedman, Generalized Inferences, Individual Merits, and
Jury Discretion, 66 B.U.L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1986).
16. See Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1359 ('Taken in the light most favorable to the
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Bendectin cases, 7 that even if the plaintiff wins the evidentiary battle she
must lose the judgment war. Though such a holding of course depends in
part on analysis of the scientific evidence, it is not based on a rule concern-
ing scientific evidence as such; rather, it is a garden variety case of summary
judgment, or of judgment as a matter of law at trial, based on the conclusion
that in the court's view the evidence taken as a whole will not support a
verdict for the plaintiff.
In some cases, then, the necessity of deciding the Frye-type problem can
be avoided by deciding the broader issue of sufficiency of all the evidence.
But of course in many cases, perhaps most, falling into at least three
categories, this means of avoidance is not available. First, if the party
presenting the challenged evidence has neither the burden of production nor
the burden of persuasion with respect to the proposition for which the
evidence is offered, the question of sufficiency never comes into play.
Second, sometimes a decision to admit the expert evidence will mean almost
inevitably that the jury could reasonably find the conclusion that the expert
asserts. Finally, often other evidence besides the expert evidence is sufficient
to support that finding. In a criminal case, for example, the prosecutor might
present ample non-scientific evidence of identification to bring the case to the
jury. If the prosecutor also presents DNA evidence of identification, the
court must confront the question of whether that evidence should be
admitted; whether with the DNA evidence or without, the case is going to
the jury, and the evidentiary question cannot be avoided.
The Daubert Court therefore recognized that, apart from the possibility
of keeping the case away from the jury altogether, "a gatekeeping role for
the judge" survives the death of Frye. 8 And the Court guaranteed that role
would be a substantial one by declaring that "under the Rules the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific evidence or testimony admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable."' 9 Elsewhere, the Court equated "evidentiary
plaintiffs, the scientific evidence that provides the scientific foundation for the expert
opinion on causation in this case is not sufficient to allow a jury to find that it is
more probable than not that Bendectin caused the minor plaintiff's injury."); Sanders,
supra note 8, at 347 ("While no study can remove all residual uncertainty regarding
Bendectin's safety, if the drug is a teratogen, it is a relatively mild one (having
effects too subtle to be measured reliably with existing techniques).").
17. Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1350, 1353, 1359; Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1989). Since Daubert, the Sixth Circuit
has followed Turpin in another Bendectin case, Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993).
18. 113 S.Ct. at 2798.
19. Id. at 2795. With respect to relevance, the Court emphasized that the
scientific proposition must "fit" the purpose for which it was offered: "[S]cientific
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reliability" with "scientific validity" as a standard for determining admissibil-
ity.20 Without attempting "to set out a definitive checklist or test" for deter-
mining the bounds of the gatekeeping role, and while stressing that "[tihe
inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . a flexible one," Justice Blackmun
offered some "general observations."2
As an organizing principle for these observations, Justice Blackmun put
great stress on Rule 702's use of the term "scientific knowledge." The
Court held that to qualify as such knowledge, "an inference or assertion must
be derived by the scientific method. "' Even at this broad level of generali-
ty, Justice Blackmun's approach raised instant controversy. Rule 702 does
not refer only to "scientific knowledge," Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out,
but also to "technical or other specialized knowledge." Does the "scientific
method" requirement apply to these other forms of knowledge as well?23 If
the answer is negative - as it presumably is - then how are these other
forms of knowledge to be distinguished from scientific knowledge?2 And
we can already imagine another, subsidiary question that is almost sure to
arise: If a given piece of evidence has some of the characteristics of
scientific evidence, but for some reason does not satisfy the "scientific
method" test, may it nevertheless be admitted under the "technical or other
specialized knowledge" branches of Rule 702 - or does such a "near miss"
disqualify the evidence from admissibility under Rule 702 altogether?
These questions are not mere hypotheticals. A great deal of the evidence
to which Rule 702 applies either is clearly not considered scientific evidence
or is close to the line between scientific and other forms of specialized
knowledge. Examples of the first type might include the testimony of a DEA
agent about the methods of drug operations, and that of a fire chief that a
given fire was the result of arson. Presumably such evidence should be
unaffected by the "scientific method" rule of Daubert, and preliminary
indications are that the lower federal courts recognize this.' Examples of
the more marginal type of case might include the testimony of economists
analyzing price data to draw an inference of a conspiracy not to compete, 26
validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated
purposes.... Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at 2796.
20. Id. at 2795 n.9, 2797.
21. Id. at 2796, 2797.
22. Id. at 2795.
23. 113 S.Ct. at 2800 (dissenting in part and concurring in part).
24. Id.
25. See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (DEA agent);
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1993) (fire chief).
26. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998
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or medical testimony based in part on the witness's clinical experience.17
To what extent the federal courts will feel compelled in such cases to apply
the "scientific method" requirement remains to be seen. Hopefully, though,
they will recognize that the dangers that led the court to impose such a
requirement are very strong only in cases of great technical complexity and
that, even in some fields of great difficulty, at least some issues are not
readily susceptible to full exploration by the scientific method.
Beyond this question of scope lie many other uncertainties. Just what
constitutes the scientific method is an enormously difficult and intractable
question. Justice Blackmun's opinion could not hope to provide a useful
definition to guide future courts. Instead, he presented four considerations
that, he said, ordinarily should be addressed "in determining whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge":2
(1) Whether the theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested."
Put another way, Justice Blackmun suggested that to be considered
scientific knowledge a proposition must be falsifiable.2 9
(2) "[W]hether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication. "'
F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1993).
27. See Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1014 (6th Cir. 1993). Note also
the comments of the Florida Supreme Court, in a post-Daubert case that adhered to
Frye:
Of course, not all expert testimony must meet [the Frye] test in order to be
admissible.. .. [P]ure opinion testimony, such as an expert's opinion that
a defendant is incompetent, does not have to meet Frye, because this type
of testimony is based on the expert's personal experience and training.
While cloaked with the credibility of the expert, this testimony is analyzed
by the jury as it analyzes any other personal opinion or factual testimony
by a witness. Profile testimony, on the other hand, by its nature necessarily
relies on some scientific principle or test, which implies an infallibility not
found in pure opinion testimony.
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). But at some stage of the
reasoning process, even expert evidence based largely on the expert's personal
experience and training usually also draws, at least implicitly, on broader principles
of the expert's discipline.
28. 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
29. Id. at 2796-97. The Chief Justice said he was "at a loss" to understand what
this means. Id. at 2800 (dissenting in part and concurring in part). Essentially, a
theory is falsifiable if, assuming hypothetically that the theory is false, a test can be
performed to demonstrate that falsity.
30. Id. at 2797.
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(3) "[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, . . the known
or potential rate of error, . . and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation." 3
(4) The degree to which the theory or technique has been accepted
within a relevant scientific community.32 Thus rises the ghost of Frye.
Each of these criteria presents substantial ambiguity. These ambiguities
are likely to complicate decisionmaking, but they will probably be genuinely
troublesome only if, contrary to the Court's stated intention, 33 lower courts
treat the criteria as checklist items, each of which must be satisfied for a
proposition to be deemed scientific, rather than merely as factors to be
weighed, along with others, into an overall balance.
(1) To what level of certainty must testing have been conducted to
satisfy the first criterion? If a technique or theory is by its nature not
testable, but has gained a substantial degree of adherence, what should the
courts' attitude be?
(2) Suppose a technique has just been devised, perhaps to address a
problem that has never or hardly ever arisen before. 4 Will evidence of the
technique be excluded simply because the technique has not been subjected
to peer review? Justice Blackmun did recognize that "[s]ome propositions
...are too particular . . . to be published." 35 But what if a proposition,
though broad enough, is too new to have been published - will that excuse
the lack of publication, or will it simply mean that the courts are not yet
ready to allow that proposition to form part of the basis for a finding of fact?
The questions of whether a proposition is sufficiently broad and - if it is
material - sufficiently ripe to have been published are potentially copious
sources of contention.
(3) How high a rate of error is too high? How shall the sufficiency of
operating standards be determined?
(4) The Court's declaration that 'general acceptance' can yet have a
bearing on the inquiry "36 preserves all the ambiguities of Frye, though they




33. Id. at 2796.
34. See, e.g., Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (conviction
affirmed based in part on evidence of toxicologist drawing on procedures developed
for the case).




(a) What must have gained broad acceptance - the fundamental
theory on which the expert bases her opinion, the particular application,
or something in between? On many questions calling for specialized
knowledge - as on many legal issues - there may be widespread
agreement on the most basic principles and then a steady divergence of
opinion as reasoning moves from general to particular.37 A test
emphasizing agreement at the broadest level may be toothless; one
demanding agreement at the narrowest level may be unrealistic. The
Daubert Court said, "The focus, of course, must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."3 But this
does little more than restate the dilemma. How narrow may a proposi-
tion in the reasoning process be and yet be deemed a "principle"? How
broad and yet be considered a "conclusion"?
(b) How broad is the relevant community in which acceptance is
measured? May a court define a field consisting of those who practice
and believe in the efficacy of a given technique?39
(c) How general must acceptance be? Presumably the abrogation of
Frye means the rejection of holdings to the effect that the existence of
a group of "scientists significant either in number or expertise [who]
37. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 57-58 (1989) ("a scientist may have
no trouble accepting the general proposition that DNA typing can be done reliably,
yet still have doubts about the reliability of the test being performed by a particular
laboratory"). Compare Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)
(dispute whether decedent received a toxic dose of succinylcholine chloride, the pres-
ence of which in the body was previously believed impossible to detect; toxicologist
testifies for the prosecution that, based on his procedures, some standard and others
new, he concluded that she did receive such a dose; other experts testify both in
support and in opposition; conviction affirmed), with People v. Young, 425 Mich.
470, 472, 485-86, 499, 391 N.W.2d 270, 270, 277, 283 (1986) (serological electro-
phoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains has not achieved sufficient scientific
acceptance to warrant admissibility, notwithstanding conceded reliability of
electrophoresis of fresh blood).
38. 113 S.Ct. at 2797.
39. Compare Robinson v. State, 47 Md. App. 558,425 A.2d 211 (1981) (general
acceptance within the field of forensic chemistry of electrophoretic techniques for
identifying source of bodily fluids held sufficient for admissibility, notwithstanding
lack of wide use of techniques outside crime laboratories), with People v. Brown, 40
Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985) (casting doubt on Robinson);
People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270, 276 (1986) (rejecting for Frye
purposes the "community of scientists having direct empirical experience with
electrophoresis of evidentiary bloodstains").
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publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable" is in itself sufficient to cause
the exclusion of evidence of the technique.' But how significant a
group, in number or expertise, of those supporting a technique or theory
will be necessary to satisfy the courts on the "acceptance" score?
(d) By what means, and how clearly, must acceptance be shown?
In particular, to what extent is publication after peer review necessary,
or sufficient, to show the requisite degree of acceptance - and what
does the acceptance criterion add to the peer review criterion?
III. THE TRANSFIGURATION OF FRYE
It appears likely that, although Daubert will change the way courts
articulate their reasoning, it will not have any dramatic impact on actual
evidentiary decisions. Though Frye purported to require extreme deference
to the scientific establishment, the deference was never complete - in some
cases, scientific battles were fought out before juries. Under the regime of
either Frye or Daubert, four decisionmakers each have a part in determining
the role that proffered scientific evidence will play in reaching a factual
conclusion: the jury (assuming there is one), the trial court, the appellate
courts, and the scientific establishment. The problem addressed by both Frye
and Daubert thus may be regarded as one of allocating power among these
actors. The courts actually decide whether the jury may consider the
evidence, though they may defer to a greater or lesser degree to the scientific
establishment; and, if the evidence is admitted, the jury then determines how
much weight to accord the evidence.
1. The Gate Between the Evidence and the Jury
The Court's rather perplexing insistence that scientific evidence must be
reliable indicates that it intends the judicial "gatekeeping role" to be a rather
stringent one." Judge Robert Sweet has said, "The trial judge's function of
determining the 'reliability' of the evideice provides the mechanism for
screening junk science. "42 But at the same time, that function also provides
40. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982) (issue whether hypnosis should be used to restore
the memory of potential witness).
41. The Court's discussion of reliability is perplexing because, as the Chief
Justice pointed out, nothing in the Rules suggests that expert evidence must be
reliable. 113 S.Ct. at 2800 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, where
two experts give conflicting opinions, presumably one opinion or the other, and at
least one underlying premise or step in the reasoning leading to the conclusion, must
be unreliable.
42. In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp.
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the mechanism for keeping the evidence away from the jury. Daubert may
therefore reflect continuing mistrust of the jury's ability to sort out the wheat
from the chaff in considering scientific evidence - or, perhaps more
precisely stated, a differential in the courts' confidence in their own and the
jury's ability to do the job.
This differential in confidence is not necessarily justified on the grounds
that judges are more sophisticated than jurors in evaluating scientific
evidence - for that is unclear. A better justification may be that the process
of judicial decisionmaking, including the methods by which information is
received and decisions are reviewed, is better suited than is the rather
awkward process of juror decisionmaking for evaluation of evidence that is
beyond at least the usual the ken of laypeople, judges, and jurors alike. In
some circumstances, judicial screening may also help the courts import the
"best evidence" principle into this realm - excluding evidence, say, of a
given type of testing, to encourage proponents in similar situations to present
a more rigorous form of evidence. And a judicial role may help to ensure
similar treatment of the same type of evidence across a range of cases; this
matter is more fully discussed below.
When all is said and done, however, an aggressive gatekeeping function
means that in some circumstances the entity constitutionally designated to be
the factfinder is barred from hearing evidence that rationally could assist the
factfinding process. Judges should exercise that function with some degree
of humility.
2. Limitations on the Trial Judge
Had the Daubert Court merely wanted to maintain restraints on the
jury's role, it could have done so without much elaboration. Indeed, the
Court could have satisfied itself by reminding trial courts that, when sitting
with a jury, they must be careful to ensure that scientific evidence will
"assist" the jury within the meaning of Rule 702, and that evidence that
appears likely to lead the jury further away from the truth, rather than closer
to it, does not meet this standard or the more general standard of Rule 403.
The Court did give at least lip service to the role of the trial judge, and it
declared that it did not intend to set out a definitive test for the admissibility
of evidence. But at the same time, it set out criteria - the overall require-
ment that scientific evidence be "valid" and derived by the scientific method,
and the more detailed criteria for determining whether this standard is met
- that appellate courts may use to evaluate the trial court's decision.
1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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Daubert, therefore, appears to anticipate an active role for the appellate
courts in the evaluation of scientific evidence.
In some situations, an active appellate role has substantial attraction.
Some issues present themselves recurrently, without much alteration from
one case to another. There is much to be said for a jurisdiction-wide
determination of such an issue. For example, is a particular method of DNA
testing, comparing a sample taken from a crime scene and a sample taken
from the suspect, sufficiently reputable to warrant admissibility? Absent
factors distinguishing one case from another on this issue, it makes sense for
the question of admissibility to be resolved for both cases by the same
decisionmaker.
Once again, the Bendectin litigation is also illustrative. Suppose one
plaintiff wins a large judgment on the ground that Bendectin more likely than
not caused her defect, and another plaintiff with the same type of defect is
denied recovery, in another court in the same jurisdiction, on the ground that
there is no admissible scientific evidence tending to prove that Bendectin is
capable of causing that type of defect. This is, at the least, a very unsatisfy-
ing result. Jurisdiction-wide determination of admissibility of the evidence
makes sense.43
It appears likely that the Daubert Court, writing in the context of a
Bendectin case, had especially in mind such broad, recurrent issues. This
might help explain the Court's emphasis on factors such as peer review and
error rates. It is important to recognize, however, that not all scientific
evidence is addressed to issues so broad or so recurrent. When the evidence
is very narrow, addressed to the particular facts of a given case, a sensible
43. Indeed, there is a plausible argument, though hardly an incontrovertible one,
for taking a stronger view, following in the line of Professors Walker and Monahan,
that the broad, recurrent issue of whether Bendectin is a human teratogen should be
determined across the jurisdiction, and the determination should then be instructed
to the jury in all cases presenting that issue, much like a ruling of law. See, e.g.,
Laurens Walker & John T. Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987). One counter-argument is that the
determination should be made by a jury, and that the desire to preserve equity across
cases should be satisfied, to the extent possible, by bringing all plaintiffs together -
through joinder or the class action device - in the litigation making that determina-
tion. Of course, complete joinder is not always possible. Principles of issue
preclusion may then apply. But the Bendectin litigation is illustrative of one potential
problem - the multiple claimant anomaly - of applying issue preclusion in the
mass tort context: Had Merrell Dow lost the first litigation on the issue of terato-
genicity, it may well have been precluded from relitigating the issue against other
claimants; a victory, however, did not preclude other claimants, and left Merrell
Dow in the position of having to relitigate the same question many times over.
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allocation of judicial responsibilities probably requires great deference to the
trial court's decision on admissibility.
3. Deference to the Scientific Establishment
Daubert, like Frye, indicates the appellate courts' unwillingness to place
too -much reliance on either juries or trial courts in evaluating scientific
evidence. But, like Frye, Daubert indicates a continued attitude of deference
to the scientific establishment. Unlike Frye, of course, Daubert does not
even purportedly make "general acceptance" an absolute precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, "general acceptance" is ex-
plicitly one of the criteria listed by the Daubert Court for determining
whether scientific evidence is admissible. And another of the criteria, peer
review and publication, is also clearly dependent on acceptance by the
scientific community.
How much reliance on the scientific community is appropriate is a
delicate question, and should probably vary from one case to another. The
more difficult the subject is, for judges as well as jurors, the more justifiable
is a tendency to defer to the scientific establishment. Perhaps more
importantly, deference is more appropriate the broader and more recurrent
the scientific issue is. Not only do breadth and recurrence make jurisdiction-
wide determination of the issue, at least for the time being, more sensible;
they also make it more likely that a generally accepted view of the scientific
community will be determinable at all.
Even when they are inclined to defer to the scientific community,
however, the courts should bear in mind that, as Justice Blackmun wrote in
Daubert,
[T]here are important differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other
hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. '
From this observation, Justice Blackmun drew the conclusion that science
tolerates bad information better than does law: Hypotheses that are incorrect
"will eventually be shown to be so" as part of "[t]he scientific project," but
"[c]onjectures that are probably wrong are of little use ... in the project of
reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment - often of great
consequence - about a particular set of events in the past."' Thus,
restricting the evidence presented to the jury is necessary under an evidentia-
44. 113 S.Ct. at 2798.
45. Id.
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ry scheme "designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding
but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. "46
True enough, but an irony should not be overlooked. For much the same
reason - that science is patient, whereas law must decide quickly - science
is much more hesitant than is law to declare conclusions and to act on
them.47 Law does so because it has to. Every day, for example, the courts
decide cases "of great consequence" under the currently prevailing legal doc-
trines, even though they know that some of those doctrines may be altered
in the near or distant future; they do not hesitate to decide because a "cosmic
understanding" of the legal issue has not yet been gained. And the same
necessity suggests that sometimes courts ought to be willing to allow juries
to take advantage of scientific information even when the scientific
establishment is unwilling to declare a conclusion.
Once more the Bendectin cases may be illustrative. Some of the
epidemiological studies suggest some connection, albeit slight, between
Bendectin and human birth defects,4 but under traditional methods of
significance testing scientists have been hesitant to draw the conclusion.49
And yet under methods of meta-analysis - a relatively new and increasingly
important research approach to accumulating knowledge across a series of
studies50 - a plausible case can be made that Bendectin is more likely than
46. Id. at 2799.
47. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 8, at 342-43 ("Scientists, being conservative,
generally try to minimize Type I errors; that is, they decline to find a causal
relationship unless it is unlikely that the observed results occurred by chance.");
Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 643, 683 (1992) ("a fundamental norm among scientists to avoid claims of
having found effects that are incorrect because of sampling error").
48. See supra note 13.
49. Ironically, although significance testing has been relied on heavily by those
courts holding in favor of Merrell Dow, the appropriateness of admitting the results
of such testing has been powerfully criticized as misleading, incomplete, and
intrusive on the function of the jury. David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical
Significance Significant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333 (1986).
50. See, e.g., R.J. Bullock & Daniel J. Svyantek, Analyzing Meta-Analysis:
Potential Problems, a Unsuccessful Replication, and Evaluation Criteria, 70 J. APPL.
PSYCH. 108, 108 (1988); LARRY V. HEDGES, STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY IN
META-ANALYSiS 4 (1982) (discussing "the low statistical power of significance tests
when effects on sample size are small"); cf. Shlomo S. Sawilowsky & Barry
Markman, Another Look at the Power of Meta-Analysis in the Solomon Fair-Group
Design, 71 J. PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 177, 177 (1990) ("Meta-analysis
techniques are usually employed on apparently diverse or seemingly conflicting
results, as opposed to a group of studies, all of which yielded the same statistical
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not a human teratogen, albeit a weak one. Although meta-analysis has been
used in a rapidly growing number of contexts and studies, it appears that
many scientists are rather hostile to it and that even many authors of research
reviews are unfamiliar with it.5 Criteria for evaluating its various methods
are still developing. 2 As compared to traditional methods of significance
testing, meta-analysis may more closely approach our evidentiary system's
willingness to allow an inference to be drawn from various bits of informa-
tion, none of which independently supports the inference.
If a court admits evidence of meta-analyses, it abandons the comfortable
harbor offered by traditional and widely accepted methods, and exposes itself
to storms of controversy over new and sometimes dubious techniques. And
yet, it may well come closer to understanding not only the cosmos, but also
the facts of the particular dispute before it. That is the type of dilemma that
arose long before Frye. And it will continue to arise long after Daubert has
receded in memory.
conclusion. Although in theory meta-analysis could be used when all studies are
barely nonsignificant, we have not seen published examples.").
51. JOHN E. HUNTER & FRANK L. SCHMIDT, METHODS OF META-ANALYSIS 14
(1990); Kenneth W. Wachter, Disturbed by Meta-Analysis?, 241 SCIENCE 1407, 1407
(1988) ("More and more scientists from all fields are resorting to 'meta-analysis'
when they review a body of scientific literature .... A boom in meta-analysis is
under way, but the boom is not being universally welcomed.").
52. See Bullock & Svyantek, supra note 50.
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